THE GATHERING STORM IN U.S. CIVIL/MILITARY RELATIONS

Owen  Whitman

7/24/99
(Updated)
 

 

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“It is of the essence of militarism that under it military men learn to despise constitutions, to sneer at parliaments, and to look with contempt on civilians.”

 

~William Graham Sumner,

The Conquest of the United States by Spain

[1898]

 

 

 

 

Historically, the United States has organized large forces to fight specific wars and quickly demobilized them at the end of a conflict. America’s founders wanted no "standing army". In fact, they solemnly promised supporters and skeptics alike there would never be one. Back in 1787, the clause "but no Appropriation of Money for that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years" was surely more than a mere bookkeeping reminder that ongoing budgets and allocations needed critical review, rather than a perfunctory  "rubber stamping" every 24 months. 

After World War II, however, the widely perceived exigencies of the Cold War required maintaining a sizable peacetime defense establishment, and this gave rise to a highly politicized military. Because so much of the armed forces' energy during the Cold War was absorbed by the overarching threat of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, the military's politicization did not then present the pernicious threat that a centralized, all volunteer and increasingly “Praetorian” military now does. 

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. military's principal raison d'être for over 40 years disappeared. Moreover, while it is clear the world remains a violent and dangerous place, the absence of a superpower adversary is unsettling to a U.S. defense establishment still possessed of enormous resources and intellectual vigor. Too, while there has been a significant reduction in U.S. defense spending, it still remains more than triple that of any single potential adversary and greater than the defense budgets of the World’s next 45 largest defense spenders combined.

The super secret "black budget" became a White House fixture in 1947, when President Truman created the CIA. Two far bigger spenders now dip into this vast and hidden till: National Security Agency (telecommunication taps), and National Reconnaissance Office (spy satellites). The Pentagon conceals the black budget in compartments they call "special access programs." New York Times columnist Tim Weiner speaks plainly:  "No one at either the Pentagon or the Congress (the would-be appropriations Branch) seems to know how many programs there are. Military officers spend hundreds of millions of dollars without any accounting. They flout the Constitution they once swore to defend."

The armed forces have also changed in a fundamental and unprecedented way: they are now composed of volunteers -- pre-screened, psychologically profiled professionals aggressively seeking a military career rather than reluctant draftees wanting to leave at the first opportunity. Not only is the new all-volunteer military undiluted by the liberalizing effect of conscription, it is also the direct descendant of the traumatized forces that lost the Vietnam War. 

True, the U.S. military brilliantly rebuilt itself and triumphed convincingly, albeit in decidedly one-sided engagements, in Desert Storm and Kosova. Still there is no question that this cycle of military failure and redemption has deeply affected the worldview of those in uniform

Still haunted by Vietnam despite its more recent successes, many in uniform now believe that military officers need to be much more active in the political process if "another Vietnam" is to be avoided. Consequently, skill at political intrigue, not warfighting, has become the mark of up-and-coming officers. Overlooked is the crucial fact that officers who concentrate on activities other than war eventually become something other than warriors

 

It is critical that an increasingly militarily naïve American public understand the basically undemocratic and authoritarian nature of military life. Officers and soldiers alike find comfort in the absolutist environment of a hierarchical organization where military rank unambiguously defines their place, and the chain of command gives clear definition, authority, and finality to decision making. By their very nature, they are frustrated and perplexed by the egalitarianism of civil society and uncomfortable with the uncertainty and deliberate chaos of the democratic process. For them, intellectual pluralism is seen as divisive and debilitating rather than creative and stimulating. Political consensus building often is perceived as chicanery or nefarious compromise rather than a productively inclusive technique. "Democracy is not," as General Colin Powell has candidly observed, "an easy form of government for military professionals." 

 

The military culture and self-concept tends to foster a benign (for the moment) contempt for democratic civil society. Certainly the military enjoys low crime rates, and why not? Unlike civil society, it has the “luxury” of both selecting its members and casting out even minor offenders. Moreover, it can relentlessly scrutinize its members' personal lives and subject them to urinalysis testing, DNA examinations, and sometimes the pseudo science of polygraphs. For the most part, the military fails to understand that their "artificial" society depends upon the largess of civil society social system with which they are uneasy and basically distrust.

 

Ironically, on many of America's secluded military bases life is relatively idyllic, thanks to the civil society it quietly criticizes. Indeed, many installations resemble the ultimate Marxist paradise: neat, rent-free homes; free utilities; subsidized shopping and day care; extensive, cost-free recreational facilities; and even government-furnished preachers. The socialized health care system, for all its faults, still outstrips that which is available to most civilians at a similar price. Important aspects of the military compensation system are a welfare queen's dream. Need a bigger house? Just have another child. Want more money? Find a mate. All of this is supported by massive panoply of government-funded social services that help “control” problems like alcohol and child abuse. 

Increasingly, the military looks at civil society and sees only chaos, crime, and moral decay. True, in part. These manifestations are unfortunately the inevitable by-products of personal freedom and aggressive individualism. But it is precisely this freedom and individualism that drives the economic engine that fuels the nation's resurgent military machine. 

The genius of American capitalism is its recognition that the pursuit of individual self-interest in an atmosphere of free competition, rowdy though it may be, can ultimately promote the common good. An independent and fiercely entrepreneurial spirit may be disastrous on the battlefield where a premium is placed on collectivism and unity of purpose, but it is an enormously important source of innovation and progress amidst the chaotic Darwinian nature and complexities of human endeavour. The despotic, albeit kindly, socialism of the armed forces may suit the peculiar needs of a professional military, but it is hardly a role model for a free society. 

At the same time that the military's post-Cold War politicization has been increasing, the public's understanding of and resistance to military influence has radically declined. Traditionally, the American people have been wary of a professional military. The Founding Fathers, for instance, were well aware that it could be a source of tyranny. Eschewing standing armies, they framed a constitution that contemplated a national defense that principally relied on militias of citizen-soldiers. Benevolent antimilitarism became a time honored American virtue. When conflicts called millions into uniform, and peacetime conscription gave millions more first-hand experience with service life, the American people held few illusions about the military. 

With the end of the draft, however, memories of the less attractive aspects of military service faded into nostalgia. For the most part, and having had little or no first-hand experience with it, the youthful civilian elites who assumed government power in the 1990s were wholly innocent of any genuine understanding of the true nature and powerful imperatives intrinsic to the armed forces. Moreover, these political elites were not antimilitary, despite what many in uniform believed at the time. Of course, few of them considered military people their social or intellectual equals; rather, they viewed the armed forces with the kind of pretentious cordiality usually reserved for faithful servants. What they did appreciate was that the military was extraordinarily competent, and they reveled in the notion that it could be "tasked" to do their bidding.   

In actuality, both the elites and the public were in the embrace of what has come to be called "postmodern militarism." One writer in 1994 described this phenomenon as follows: "Postmodern militarism is not marked by overt military dominance or even a societal embrace of martial values. Rather, it is characterized by a growing willingness of an increasingly militarily naive public to charge those in uniform with responsibilities that a democracy ought to leave to civilians. It is a direct consequence of America's deep frustration and disgust with elected government's inability to work effectively, or to even labor honestly." 

The reason the military's approval rating far exceeds that of every other institution in American society including, significantly, the ones expected to exercise civilian control is quite simple: it gets things done. 

Embattled politicians ever more frequently turn to the military for quick fixes: Can't stop drugs? Call in the Navy. FEMA overwhelmed? Deploy the Airborne. Crime out of control? Put Guardsmen on the streets. Troubled youths? Marine role models and military boot camps. Need health care? Military medics to the rescue. Diplomats stumble again? Launch another Tomahawk send in the Marines. The unapologetically authoritarian military can "make the trains run on time," but at what price? That question always remains unanswered

Ominously, the civilian institutions intended to control the military are weakening. Congress' partisanship and pre-occupation with re-election, makes it increasingly vulnerable to manipulation by politically astute military operatives who have become expert at playing congressional factions against each other; the executive branch hasn't fared much better. At the beginning of the Clinton administration, for example, there were numerous reports of open contempt by military personnel for their commander in chief. 

Although many observers believed the initial hostility later dissipated, President Clinton's continued vulnerability was illustrated by the Lewinsky affair and the uproar that greeted an attempt by his lawyers to delay a lawsuit by characterizing him as a member of the armed forces. As late as 1999, and the U.S. sponsored NATO attack on Yugoslavia, analysts still maintained that Clinton had not yet been able to "command" the Pentagon. A politically empowered, independent and increasingly defiant military has now become, as one commentator put it, "the most powerful individual actor in Washington politics."

 

 

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