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Historically, the United States has organized large
forces to fight specific wars and quickly demobilized those forces at the end
of a conflict. America’s founders wanted no "standing army" at all.
In fact, they solemnly promised supporters and skeptics alike there would
never be one. Back in 1787, the clause "but
no Appropriation of Money for that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years" was surely more than a mere bookkeeping reminder that
ongoing budgets and allocations needed critical review, rather than a
perfunctory "rubber stamping" every 24 months. After
World War II, however, the generally perceived exigencies of the Cold War
required maintaining a sizable peacetime defense establishment, and this gave
impetus to a highly politicized military. Because so much of the armed
forces' energy during the Cold War was absorbed by the overarching threat of
a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, the military's politicization did not then
present the pernicious threat
that a centralized, all volunteer and increasingly “Praetorian”
military now does. When
the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. military's principal raison d'être for
over 40 years disappeared. And while it is clear the world remains a violent
and dangerous place, the absence of a superpower adversary is unsettling to a
U.S. defense establishment still possessed of enormous resources and
intellectual vigor. Too, while there has been a significant reduction in U.S.
defense spending, it still remains more than triple that of any single
potential adversary and greater
than the defense budgets of the World’s next 45 largest defense spenders
combined. The
super secret "black budget" became a White House fixture in 1947
when President Truman created the CIA. Two far bigger spenders now dip into
this vast
and hidden till: National Security Agency (telecommunication
taps), and National Reconnaissance Office (spy satellites). The
Pentagon conceals
the black budget in compartments they call "special access
programs." New York Times columnist Tim Weiner speaks
plainly: "No one at either the Pentagon or the Congress (the
would-be appropriations Branch) seems to know how many programs
there are. Military
officers spend hundreds of millions of dollars without any accounting. They flout
the Constitution they once swore to defend." The
armed forces have also changed in a fundamental
and unprecedented way: they are now composed of volunteers --
pre-screened, psychologically profiled professionals aggressively seeking a
military career rather than reluctant draftees wanting to leave at the first
opportunity. Not only is the new all-volunteer military undiluted by
the liberalizing effect of conscription, it is also the direct
descendant of the traumatized forces that lost the Vietnam War. True,
the U.S. military brilliantly rebuilt itself and triumphed convincingly,
albeit in decidedly one-sided engagements, in Desert Storm and Kosova. Still
there is no question that this cycle of military failure and redemption has
deeply
affected the worldview of those in uniform. Still haunted by Vietnam despite its more recent successes, many in uniform now believe that military officers need to be much more active in the political process if "another Vietnam" is to be avoided. Consequently, skill at political intrigue, not warfighting, has become the mark of up-and-coming officers. Overlooked is the crucial fact that officers who concentrate on activities other than war eventually become something other than warriors. It
is critical that an increasingly militarily naïve American public understand
the basically undemocratic
and authoritarian nature of military life. Officers and soldiers
alike find comfort in the absolutist environment of a hierarchical
organization where military rank unambiguously defines their place, and the
chain of command gives clear definition, authority, and finality to decision
making. By their very nature, they are frustrated and perplexed by the
egalitarianism of civil society and uncomfortable with the uncertainty and
deliberate chaos of the democratic process. For them, intellectual pluralism
is seen as divisive and debilitating rather than creative and stimulating.
Political consensus building often is viewed as chicanery or nefarious
compromise rather than a productively inclusive technique. "Democracy is
not," as General Colin Powell has candidly observed, "an easy form
of government for military professionals." The military culture and self-concept tends to
foster a benign (for the moment) contempt for democratic civil society. Certainly the
military enjoys low crime rates, but why shouldn't it? Unlike civil society,
it has the luxury of both selecting its members and casting out even minor
offenders. Moreover, it can relentlessly scrutinize its members' personal
lives and subject them to urinalysis testing, DNA examinations, and sometimes
the pseudo science of polygraphs. For the most part, the military fails to
understand that their "artificial" society depends upon the largess
of civil society social system with which they are uneasy and basically
distrust. Ironically, on many of America's secluded military bases life is relatively idyllic, thanks to the civil society it quietly criticizes. Indeed, many installations resemble the ultimate Marxist paradise: neat, rent-free homes; free utilities; subsidized shopping and day care; extensive, cost-free recreational facilities; and even government-furnished preachers. The health care system, for all its faults, still outstrips that which is available to most civilians at a similar price. Important aspects of the military compensation system are a welfare queen's dream. Need a bigger house? Just have another child. Want more money? Find a mate. All of this is supported by massive panoply of government-funded social services that help control problems like alcohol and child abuse. Increasingly,
the military looks at civil society and sees only chaos, crime, and moral
decay. True, in part. These manifestations are unfortunately the inevitable
by-products of personal freedom and aggressive individualism. But it is
precisely this freedom and individualism that drives the economic engine that
fuels the nation's resurgent military machine. The
genius of American capitalism is its recognition that the pursuit of
individual self-interest in an atmosphere of free competition, rowdy though
it may be, can ultimately promote the common good. An independent and
fiercely entrepreneurial spirit may be disastrous on the battlefield where a premium
is placed on unity of purpose, but it is an enormously important source of
innovation and progress amidst the chaotic Darwinian nature and complexities
of human endeavour. The despotic, albeit kindly, socialism of the armed
forces may suit the peculiar needs of a professional military, but it is
hardly a role model for a free society. At
the same time that the military's post-Cold War politicization
has been increasing, the public's understanding of and
resistance to military influence has radically declined.
Traditionally, the American people have been wary of a professional military.
The Founding Fathers, for instance, were well aware that it could be a source
of tyranny. Eschewing standing armies, they framed a constitution that
contemplated a national defense that principally relied on militias of
citizen-soldiers. Benevolent antimilitarism became a time honored American
virtue. When conflicts called millions into uniform, and peacetime
conscription gave millions more first-hand experience with service life, the
American people held few illusions about the military. With
the end of the draft, however, memories of the less attractive aspects of
military service faded into nostalgia. For the most part, and having had
little or no first-hand experience with it, the youthful civilian elites who
assumed government power in the 1990s were wholly innocent of any genuine
understanding of the true nature and powerful imperatives intrinsic to the
armed forces. Moreover, these political elites were not antimilitary, despite
what many in uniform believed at the time. Of course, few of them considered
military people their social or intellectual equals; rather, they viewed the
armed forces with the kind of pretentious cordiality usually reserved for
faithful servants. What they did appreciate was that the military was
extraordinarily competent, and they reveled
in the notion that it could be "tasked" to do their bidding. In
actuality, both the elites and the public were in the embrace of what has
come to be called "postmodern militarism." One writer in
1994 described this phenomenon as follows: "Postmodern militarism is not
marked by overt military dominance or even a societal embrace of martial
values. Rather, it is characterized by a growing willingness of an
increasingly militarily naive public to charge those in uniform with
responsibilities that a democracy ought to leave to civilians. It is a direct
consequence of America's deep frustration and disgust with elected
government's inability to work effectively, or to even labor
honestly." The
reason the military's approval rating far exceeds that of every other
institution in American society including, significantly, the ones expected
to exercise civilian control is quite simple: it gets things done. Embattled
politicians ever more frequently turn to the military for quick fixes: Can't
stop drugs? Call in the Navy. FEMA overwhelmed? Deploy the Airborne. Crime out
of control? Put Guardsmen on the streets. Troubled youths? Marine role models
and military boot camps. Need health care? Military medics to the rescue.
Diplomats stumble again? Launch another Tomahawk send in the Marines. The
unapologetically authoritarian military can "make the trains run on
time," but
at what price? That question always remains unanswered. That question always remains unanswered. Ominously,
the civilian institutions that are intended to control the military are
weakening. Congress' partisanship and pre-occupation with
re-election, makes it increasingly vulnerable to manipulation by
politically astute military operatives who have become expert at playing
congressional factions against each other; the executive branch hasn't
fared much better. At the beginning of the Clinton administration, for
example, there were numerous reports of open contempt by military personnel
for their commander in chief. Although
many observers believed the initial hostility later dissipated, President
Clinton's continued vulnerability was illustrated by the Lewinsky affair and
the uproar that greeted an attempt by his lawyers to delay a lawsuit by
characterizing him as a member of the armed forces. As late as 1999, and the
U.S. sponsored NATO attack on Yugoslavia, analysts still maintained that
Clinton had not yet been able to "command" the Pentagon. A
politically empowered, independent and increasingly defiant military has now
become, as one commentator put it, "the
most powerful individual actor in Washington politics." |
